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DIVORCE-PARENT AND CHILD:
IMPUTING INCOME TO AN OBLIGOR BASED ON EARNING
CAPACITY-THE RECENT GUIDELINE APPROACH
Nelson v. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
Plaintiff, Jody Lynn Nelson (Jody), appealed from a decree decreas-
ing her ex-husband's child support obligation for their two children.1
Before the parties' divorce, the defendant, Keith Nelson (Keith), worked
for the Overhead Door Company as an installer making $10.50 per
hour.2 Shortly after the divorce however, he left that company to work
for Red River Overhead Door Company, where he earned less income. 3
In 1993, Keith left that job and started his own overhead door business, 4
where he made an hourly income of $4.99 per hour.5
In 1995, Keith moved to reduce his child support obligation due to
a "dramatic reduction in income." 6 Jody argued that Keith should not
be allowed to subsidize his business venture at the expense of his chil-
dren's welfare. 7 However, Keith maintained that the reason he decided
to change employment was the "ambitious goal of operating his own
business." 8 Furthermore, Keith asserted that the court should not place
artificial barriers on divorced parents' employment opportunities by
declaring that they cannot start their own business and pursue economic
freedom because of their child support obligation.9
Jody resisted Keith's motion for reduction in child support, claim-
ing that his reduction in income was voluntary and only temporary. 10 In
the alternative, Jody urged that if the court found that a modification was
1. Nelson v. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d 741, 743 (N.D. 1996). When the parties were divorced in Janu-
ary of 1992, the divorce decree placed custody of the two children with Jody and ordered Keith to pay
$526 monthly child support. Id. The decree was amended in December of 1992 and Keith was
ordered to pay $568 per month. Id. As of the most recent judgment at the trial court level, Keith was
ordered to pay $252 per month. Brief for Appellant at 3, Nelson (No. 950299).
2. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 743.
3. Id. Keith earned $27,130 at Overhead Door Company in 1991, and $17,361 at the Red River
Overhead Door Company in 1992. Id.
4. Id. at 743, 747. Keith earned $8,292 in 1993 and $10,005 in 1994. Id. at 743. In June of 1994,
he filed for bankruptcy. Id. Keith contended that he should be applauded, not chastised, for handling
his debts and obligations through bankruptcy proceedings. Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Nelson (No.
950299).
5. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 747.
6. Id. at 743.
7. Brief for Appellant at 6, Nelson (No. 950299).
8. Brief for Appellee at 8, Nelson (No. 950299).
9. Id. at 9. Keith claimed that he would literally be an "economic hostage" to the his ex-wife if
he was not able to make his own decisions regarding employment and starting his own business. Id.
10. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 743.
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warranted, it should also find that Keith was underemployed as defined
by the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines." If Keith was found to
be underemployed, the court could impute more income to him so that
the support award would not be as drastically reduced. 12 The imputation
would consider Keith's prior earnings and experience in the door
installation business to increase the child support obligation computed
from his present income.1 3
After the hearing on Keith's motion, the trial court issued its
memorandum decision where it concluded that the North Dakota Depart-
ment of Human Services had exceeded its rule-making authority when it
drafted the imputation remedy for underemployment, and therefore the
imputation remedy was unlawful.1 4 The trial court instead applied a
"rule of reason" and concluded that Keith was entitled to a reduction in
his child support obligation.' 5 Jody then appealed, arguing that the
underemployment guideline remedy was not unreasonable and that
Keith's child support obligation should not have been reduced because
his reduction in income was voluntary and only temporary.16
The Supreme Court of North Dakota first stated that because obli-
gors are entitled to periodic review of their child support obligation, they
are not precluded from seeking a modification when application of the
guidelines to their present income will reduce the support obligation,
even if it is due to a voluntary change in employment.17 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the North Dakota Department of
Human Services reasonably exercised their rule-making authority when
drafting the child support guideline remedy for underemployment and
allowing for the imputation of income to an obligor.18 The court further
held that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that Jody
had failed to prove that Keith was underemployed so as to apply the
guideline remedy and impute income to him. 19
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the recent child support guideline
remedy allowing for the imputation of income, it is useful to trace the
early development of the child support guidelines. Next, the current
11. id.
12. Id.
13. Brief for Appellant at 17, Nelson (No. 950299).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id.
16. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 743.
17. Id.




analysis of modification proceedings will demonstrate how today child
support obligations may be altered to accommodate the needs of the
children and the ability of the parent to pay. Finally, a new consider-
ation of the guidelines will be explored-how earning capacity is now
utilized to impute income to an underemployed obligor as a mechanism
of enforcing a parent's duty to support his or her children.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDELINES
The North Dakota child support guidelines were enacted in accor-
dance with federal law. 20 Beginning in the mid-seventies with the
amendments to the Social Security Act, child support laws became
increasingly federally mandated. 2 1 Throughout the next decade, the
laws concerning child support were incrementally enhanced, and eventu-
ally led to the adoption and use of discretionary guidelines. 22 These
guidelines were to be a tool to efficiently and mathematically calculate
child support orders, which would in turn expedite the process of setting
support orders and forego formal judicial proceedings in every case. 23
Furthermore, the use of formula guidelines was meant to remedy the in-
consistent and sometimes inadequate results of random judicial action. 24
With the Family Support Act of 1988,25 Congress mandated that
state child support guidelines become binding rather than discretion-
ary. 26 This Act was part of welfare reform intended to strengthen the
enforcement of child support obligations so that innocent children
receive the proper care that they deserve and so that parents recognize
their responsibility to support their children. 27 Federal law allows guide-
lines to be established by legislative, judicial, or administrative action. 28
In addition, federal law requires: 1) that the guidelines be reviewed at
20. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-65 (1988 & Supp. 1996) (codifying Title IV-D of the Social Securities
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2348).
21. See id. §§ 651-62 (codifying 1974 Social Service Amendments to the Social Securities Act).
22. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988)). See Burrell v. Burrell, 359 N.W.2d
381, 384 (N.D. 1985) (stating that the court is only required to consider the guidelines as a suggested
scale, and is not bound by them).
23. Linda Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 103, 116 (1990).
24. Clutter v. McIntosh, 484 N.W.2d 846, 848 (N.D. 1992).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 687 (Supp. 1996).
26. Id.
27. Shipley v. Shipley, 509 N.W.2d 49, 54 (N.D. 1993) (citing 134 CONG. REC. 14895 (daily ed.
June 16, 1988) (statement of Bill Bradley) (supporting mandatory immediate income withholding for
all child support orders)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1994). Nineteen states have adopted statutory child support guidelines, 22
states have adopted guideline by court rule, and 10 states use administrative rule; when changes need
to be made, administrative or court rules prove to be more easily modified. Elrod, supra note 23, at
117-18.
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least once every four years; and 2) that there be a presumption that the
amount of child support reflected in the guidelines be correct.29
North Dakota adopted guidelines by administrative rule; essentially
reiterating the requirements of federal law. 30 In 1989, the North Dakota
legislature provided statutory authority for the Department of Human
Services to establish child support guidelines to aid courts in determining
the proper amount that a parent should be expected to contribute toward
the support of a child. 3 1  The statutory authority also created a pre-
sumption that the guideline amount would be correct. 32 Finally, the
statutory authority provided for the periodic review of all child support
orders. 33
In 1991, the Department of Human Services effectuated these legis-
lative directives and established child support guidelines by adopting an
obligor model. 34 The obligor model authorizes a percentage of the
obligor's income to be used for child support based on reliable and
contemporary economic evidence of the cost of raising children. 35
Because the North Dakota Department of Human Services is a state
29. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994).
30. Compare N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1 (1995), with 42 U.S.C. § 667 (demonstrating that
state and federal law have similar requirements with respect to child support guideline review and the
presumption of guideline correctness).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(1) (Supp. 1995. The statute requires that the guidelines "(a)
include consideration of gross income, (b) authorize an expense deduction for determining net
income, (c) designate other available resources to be considered, and (d) specify the circumstances
which should be considered in reducing support considerations on the basis of hardship." Id.
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(3) (1991). The original section read:
There is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support which would result
from the application of the child support guidelines is the correct amount of child support.
The presumption may be rebutted if a preponderance of the evidence in a contested
matter establishes that factors not considered by the guidelines will result in an undue
hardship to the obligor or a child for whom support is sought. A written finding or a
specific finding on the record must be made if the court determines that the presumption
has been rebutted.
Id.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4 (Supp. 1995). Initially, the 1989 legislation directing statutory
authority for periodic review applied only to child support orders being enforced by child support
agencies. Garbe v. Garbe, 467 N.W.2d 740, 742 (N.D. 1991) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4).
However, this temporary section was replaced by a permanent section that provided for periodic
review of all child support orders, effective October 1, 1993. Id.
34. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1 (1995); see also Ecklund v. Ecklund, 538 N.W.2d 182, 187
(N.D. 1995) (clarifying the decision to choose the "obligor model" because the alternative "income
shares model" would lead to increased litigation costs, was more complex, and because ultimately
there was little or no difference in award amounts between the "obligor model" and the "income
shares model"); Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572, 573 (N.D. 1994) (explaining that North Dakota's
"obligor model" guidelines are based on the obligor's net monthly income and the number of children
for whom the support is sought).
35. REPORT OF THE NORTh DAKOTA L EGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 53RD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 19 (1993).
The study, done by the National Center for State Courts, reported that states using the obligor model
include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. "Obligor" is defined as any
person owing a duty of support. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.10 (Supp. 1995).
790
1997] CASE COMMENT
agency 36 it must act in accordance with the prescribed procedures found
in the Administrative Agencies Practice Act 37 in order for the guidelines
it promulgates to be valid. 38
The 1988 version of the guidelines administered by the Department
of Human Services was not properly promulgated, and therefore was
found invalid by the North Dakota Court of Appeals-which meant the
guidelines were not binding upon the trial courts. 39 However, section
14-09-09.7 of the North Dakota Century Code was amended to codify a
substantive rule requiring identified and written findings by the trial
court in order to depart from the guidelines, effective July 12, 1989,40
and consequently the guidelines became binding in prospective cases.4 1
The most recent version of the guidelines became effective February 1,
1995.42 Current law states that trial courts are bound by the guideline
amounts when determining an initial support obligation and during the
modification of any support order over one year old. 43
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01 (Supp. 1995). "'Administrative agency' or 'agency' means
each board, bureau, commission, department or other administrative unit of the executive branch of
state government ... or other persons directly or indirectly purporting to act on behalf or under
authority of the agency." Id.
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02 (Supp. 1995).
38. Id. Administrative rules that are properly promulgated have the force and effect of law.
Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226, 232 (N.D. 1994).
39. Illies v. Illies 462 N.W.2d 878, 883 (N.D. 1990); Huber v. Jahner, 460 N.W.2d 717, 720
(N.D. Ct. App. 1990).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(3) (Supp. 1995). The amended section states:
There is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support that would result
from the application of the child support guidelines is the correct amount of child support.
The presumption may be rebutted if a preponderance of the evidence in a contested
matter establishes, applying criteria by the public authority which take into consideration
the best interests of the child, that the child support amount established under the
guidelines is not the correct amount of child support. A written finding or a specific
finding on the record must be made if the court determines that the presumption has been
rebutted. The finding must:
(a) State the child support amount determined through application of the
guidelines;
(b) Identify the criteria that rebut the presumption of correctness of that
amount; and
(c) State the child support amount determined after application of the criteria
that rebut the presumption.
Id.
41. Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.w.2d 96, 102 (N.D. 1990).
42. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1 (1995). The successive versions of the guidelines are:
Version 1, effective November 3, 1980; Version II, effective February 8, 1984; Version II, effective
October 18, 1988; Version IV, effective February 1, 1991; and the current Version V, effective
February 1, 1995. Kirk Smith, Child Support Enforcement: A Case for Balance-The Rational
Limitations of Child Support Enforcement Guidelines, 72 N.D. L. REV. 73, 79 n.22 (1996).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-09.7(3), 14-09-08.4(3) (Supp. 1995).
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B. CURRENT ANALYSIS OF MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
The prevailing view, that child support obligations may be modified
throughout a child's minority years based upon a material change in
circumstances, was based on tradition. 44 Prior North Dakota law man-
dated that only upon a showing of a material change of circumstances
would a child support order be modified.45 This material change was
determined through a fact-finding inquiry by the trial court.46
The question then became whether adoption of the guidelines
amounted to a material change in circumstances in order to modify
existing child support obligations. 47 North Dakota courts did not find
that the adoption of the guidelines was a sufficient change in circum-
stances to warrant modification. 48 It was not until a material change of
circumstances was found, without reference to the guidelines, that the
trial court could modify the child support.49
However, with the legislature's adoption of periodic review of all
support orders, the standards and procedures for modifying child
support obligations became more refined.5 0 Current law mandates that
an obligor is only required to show a material change in circumstances if
the obligor is seeking to modify a support order within a year of a prior
order. 51 When an obligor seeks to modify a support obligation that is
more than one year old, statutory authority requires that the trial court
modify the obligation so as to conform to the current guideline
amounts. 52
The obligor's burden of proof in demonstrating a change in
circumstances is satisfied by a showing of a change in the financial
44. Elrod, supra note 23, at 123.
45. See Ecklund v. Ecklund, 538 N.W.2d 182, 185 (N.D. 1995) (stating that the doctrine of
changed circumstances gives a limited finality effect to a child support order and yet leaves room for
subsequent revisions for the best interests of the child); Skoglund v. Skoglund, 333 N.W.2d 795, 796
(N.D. 1983) (stating that courts have the power to modify the amount of child support to be paid
whenever the circumstances of the parties have materially changed).
46. Sweeney v. Hoff, 478 N.W.2d 9, 10 (N.D. 1991).
47. Elrod, supra note 23, at 123. South Dakota was one of the states that decided that adoption of
the guidelines was a sufficient change in circumstances so as to allow for a modification of a parent's
support award. Id. at 123 n.I 11. However, Minnesota remained constant with the requirement that a
change in circumstances must come from analysis of the statutory factors. Id.
48. Garbe v. Garbe, 467 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D. 1991) (holding that "[tihe disparity between the
obligor's current payments and the payments suggested by the guidelines cannot serve as a basis for
finding a change in circumstances").
49. Id. (citing State ex rel. Younger v. Bryant, 465 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1991)).
50. See Ecklund, 538 N.W.2d at 185-86 (discussing the change in procedures for modifying child
support obligations).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4(3) (Supp. 1995); see also Schmidt v. Reamann, 523 N.W.2d
70, 72-73 (N.D. 1994) (finding that there was no material change in circumstances within the one year
period because the obligor had failed to present sufficient evidence of a change).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4(3).
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circumstances of either party. 53 This change is also analyzed as to
whether it was foreseen or contemplated at the time of the initial
decree. 54 If changed circumstances are based upon a financial change,
then the needs of the children and the ability of the obligor to pay must
be taken into account in determining whether the modification should be
granted.5 5 In addition, the inquiry is taken beyond the mere financial
change to the cause of the change, and whether it was permanent or
temporary, or due to a voluntary act or neglect on the part of the
obligor. 56 This scrutiny leads to trial courts examining not only the
obligor's actual income, but also the obligor's earning capacity.5 7
C. NEW CONSIDERATIONS: How EARNING CAPACITY AND THE
IMPUTATION OF INCOME ARE USED
1. The Judicial Approach
An obligor's earning capacity was considered by trial courts in
child support modification proceedings long before it was officially
incorporated into the North Dakota child support guidelines. 5 8 The
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that an obligor's ability to pay
is not based solely on actual income, but rather on the obligor's net
worth. 59 In many pre-guideline cases, the court examined the reason for
the obligor's inability to meet his or her child support obligations before
reducing the amounts.60 Included in this analysis was whether the obli-
gors had voluntarily put themselves in a position where they were unable
to make their child support payments and whether this situation was
temporary.61
Though the early guidelines did not specifically allow for the
imputation of income, 62 the court recognized the parental duty to
53. Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d 74, 76 (N.D. 1985).
54. Sweeney v. Hoff, 478 N.W.2d 9, 10 (N.D. 1991).
55. Skoglund v. Skoglund, 333 N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1983).
56. Sweeney, 478 N.W.2d at 10 (citing Gabel v. Gabel, 434 N.W.2d 722, 723 (N.D. 1989); Bloom
v. Fyllesvold, 420 N.W.2d 327, 331 (N.D. 1988); Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d 74, 76 (N.D. 1985)).
57. Skoglund, 333 N.W.2d at 796 (citing Schnell v. Schnell, 252 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1977)).
58. See id.
59. Burrell v. Burrell, 359 N.W.2d 381, 383 (N.D. 1985). The extent of the obligor's net worth
includes physical assets and earning ability as demonstrated by past income. Id.
60. See, e.g., Perry v. Perry, 382 N.W.2d 628, 630 (N.D. 1986); Hoster v. Hoster, 216 N.W.2d
698, 701 (N.D. 1974).
61. See, e.g., Gabel v. Gabel, 434 N.W.2d 722, 724 (N.D. 1989) (finding that the obligor's
unemployment was only temporary and consequently refusing to reduce his child support obligation);
Perry, 382 N.W.2d at 630 (concluding that the obligor had voluntarily placed himself in a position
where he was unable to make his support payments, and consequently refusing to reduce the
obligation).
62. See Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 722 (N.D. 1993) (citing Guskjolen v. Guskjolen, 499
N.W.2d 126, 128 (N.D. 1993); Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873, 878 (N.D. 1992)).
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support one's children. 63 Furthermore, the court emphasized in certain
situations that the best remedy for an obligor who is experiencing a
temporary inability to make support payments is not a permanent
reduction in the support award, but rather a request for a delay in
making the support payments.64
As case law developed in the early nineties, issues concerning child
support obligations sparked interesting public policy concerns such as
the imputation of income. 65 In a 1994 case, the North Dakota Supreme
Court looked at a study of child support guidelines in various states and
noted that in thirty states, courts are imputing income to an obligor who
is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed. 66 In that same year, the
supreme court implemented a "rule of reason," whereby an obligor
with an established earnings history was not allowed to drastically reduce
his or her income without good reason. 67 When obligors with an estab-
lished earning history voluntarily, without good reason, place themselves
in a position where they cannot meet their child support obligation,
income compatible with their prior earnings history may be imputed. 68
This judicially-adopted measure of imputing income to a voluntarily
underemployed obligor continued to be used in subsequent cases.
6 9
However, this judicial rule preceded the current version of the
administrative rule found in the child support guidelines.
70
2. The Guideline Approach
Prior to the current version, the 1991 guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Human Services did allow for the imputation of income
based on assets, 7 1 not on earning capacity, but the provision failed in
63. Perry, 382 N.W.2d at 630. The court stated, "A parents duty to support his or her children is
continuous and does not depend on his or her prosperity ... it is both a legal and moral obligation."
Id. (citation omitted).
64. Schmidt v. Reamann, 523 N.W.2d 70, 73 (N.D. 1994).
65. See Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1992) (discussing the Appellant's argument
that minimum wage should be imputed to his former wife for computation of her child support
obligation because she did not work outside the home, and recommending that this argument be made
to the Department of Human Services-the agency responsible for promulgating the child support
guidelines).
66. Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 511 N.W.2d 230, 233 (N.D. 1994).
67. Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D. 1994).
68. Id.
69. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 538 N.W.2d 189, 193 (N.D. 1995) (concluding that the husband
had not voluntarily changed his employment in bad faith and that he had stated legitimate reasons for
the change); Schatke v. Schatke, 520 N.W.2d 833, 837 (N.D. 1994) (finding that the trial court had
erred in imputing income because they had made no findings of fact as to the husband's earning
capacity and whether his continued unemployment was voluntary).
70. See Schatke, 520 N.W.2d at 837 n.2 (citing to the proposed provision of the administrative
code that would allow for the imputation of income based on earning capacity and stating that the
problems arising with these cases would probably end with the passing of these proposed rules).
71. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07 (1991) (amended in 1995). The provision stated, in part:
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CASE COMMENT
practice. 72 Consequently, the Guidelines Advisory Task Force for the
Department of Human Services (Task Force) conducted research aimed
at developing a more functional process of imputing income. 73 The
primary obstacles facing the task force were first, how to determine an
obligor's actual earning capacity and second, how to overcome practical
constraints with regard to proving this earning capacity.
74
The new section proposed by the Task Force provided a basis for
imputing income based on earning capacity, rather than on assets, to an
obligor who is unemployed or underemployed. 75 An obligor is "'under-
employed' if the obligor's gross income earnings is significantly less
than prevailing amounts earned in the community by persons with
similar work history and occupational qualifications."
76
The key characteristics of this new section were: "1) a presumption
of underemployed, 2) exceptions to the presumption, 3) articulation of
how the presumption may be rebutted, and 4) what level of income
should be used if the presumption is not rebutted." 77  Furthermore,
income must be imputed if an obligor fails to present necessary informa-
tion to rebut or avoid the presumption. 78
Practical constraints with proof problems were also addressed by the
Task Force. 79 Potential difficulties were determining the "prevailing
amounts earned in the community by persons with similar work history
and occupational qualifications," and how to prove them.80 The main
concern was that expert testimony would be needed to show the
prevailing amounts earned in the community, which would lead to a
longer, more expensive, and more drawn out process. 81
However, the Task Force addressed this concern by stating that
prevailing wages could be shown by the North Dakota Labor Market
All assets, other than property claimable as a homestead ... necessary household goods
and furnishings, and one motor vehicle which the parent owns an equity not in excess of
fifteen thousand dollars must be considered for the purpose of imputing income. Annual
net property income equal to six percent of the parent's equity interest in all such
property which does not produce at least six percent return on equity, reduced by the
actual net property income, must be imputed.
Id.
72. Telephone Interview with Blaine Nordwall, Member of the Guidelines Advisory Task Force
in 1993 (Sept. 18, 1996). This provision failed in part because its language was too general, it did not
base the imputation on earning capacity, and it didn't properly impute assets. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Blaine Nordwall, Summary of Comments Received in Regard to Proposed Amendments to
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1, at 17 (Nov. 14, 1994) (on file with the North Dakota Department of
Human Services).
76. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(1)(6) (1995).
77. Tina M. Heinrich, The Guidelines, They Are A Changin', GAVEL, June-July 1994, at 8, 9.
78. Id.
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Advisor, a publication by Job Service of North Dakota.82 The Task
Force noted that the information contained in this publication, which lists
common types of occupations by county, would be a reliable, judicially
noticeable indicator of the prevailing amounts earned in the com-
munity. 83 When an obligor is determined to be unemployed or
underemployed so as to require application of the guideline remedy,
income may be imputed in three ways: minimum wage, relevant pre-
vailing wage, or past earnings.84 The greatest of the three variations is
the amount imputed to the obligor.85 After public hearings, the Task
Force's recommendations for imputing income were adopted as part of




In Nelson v. Nelson,87 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's modification of Keith's child support obligation, but
disagreed with most of the trial court's reasoning for not imputing
income to him. 88 Nevertheless, the court stated that it agreed with one
valid reason and the ultimate result. 89 After discussing the current
procedure for modification of Keith's child support obligation, the
supreme court examined two issues: first, whether the child support
guideline remedy for underemployment was an unreasonable exercise of
the rule-making authority of the North Dakota Department of Human
Services; and second, whether the trial court had properly concluded that
Jody had failed to present sufficient evidence of her ex-husband's
underemployment for application of the guideline remedy. 90
A. THE PROCEDURE FOR MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATION
The North Dakota Supreme Court began by explaining that the
voluntary nature of Keith's change in financial circumstances would
have been a relevant factor to consider under prior law. 9 1 The cited
former child support modification cases that required a material change
82. Id.
83. Id. This information would be judicially noticeable under Rule 201 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence. Id.
84. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(a)(b)(c) (1995).
85. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(8)(a)(b) (1995).
86. § 75-02-04.1-07.
87. 547 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1996).
88. Nelson v. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d 741, 743 (N.D. 1996).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 744-46.
91. Id. at 743-44.
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in circumstances as a prerequisite for modification. 92 In these prior
cases, the material change was predominantly a financial one; therefore
the courts had to also consider the voluntariness of the obligor's finan-
cial change before determining whether modification of the support
award was warranted. 93
However, because of new legislation directing periodic review of all
child support orders, the court concluded that this analysis was no longer
applicable to an obligor who sought modification of his obligation after
one year of entry of the prior support order. 94 Now, if the obligor
correctly seeks to modify an obligation after one year of prior decree,
section 14-09-08.4(3) requires the court to conform to the amount
specified in the guidelines. 95 Yet it was recognized that the prerequisite
for a material change in circumstances was not eliminated from cases in
which an obligor sought to modify the support order within one year of
the prior order. 9 6  In Nelson, Keith, the obligor, did not have to
demonstrate a material change in circumstances because his support
order was over one year old. 97 Therefore, the court stated that he was
not precluded from seeking a modification when application of the
guidelines to his current income would reduce his child support
obligation.98
The court then examined Jody's argument that the appropriate
remedy for Keith's temporary reduction in income would be to delay
the making of a portion of the support payments rather than perma-
nently reduce them.99 The court reflected on previous opinions where
such a delay was ordered as an alternative to reducing the obligation, and
agreed that this was a viable and preferred method of relief. 100 However,
in the present situation the court determined that due to the extent and
duration of Keith's reduction in income, the trial court had properly
granted modification of his support obligation. 101 In conclusion, the
92. Id. at 743 (citing Sweeney v. Hoff, 478 N.W.2d 9, 10 (N.D. 1991)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 744 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4 (Supp. 1995)).
95. Id. at 744 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.4(3)).




100. Id. (citing Schmidt v. Reamann, 523 N.W.2d 70, 73 (N.D. 1994) (suggesting that the best
relief when an obligor is experiencing difficulty in meeting his child support payments is to delay them
rather than permanently reducing them in order to balance the needs of the children with the obligor's
ability to pay); Hartman v. Hartman, 466 N.W.2d 155, 157 (N.D. 1991) (finding that a delay in making
payments serves to temporarily relieve the obligor when the children's need for the support has not
changed)).
101. Id. The defendant had gone from making $17,361 to $10,005 over a two year period. Id. at
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court reminded Jody that if and when Keith's business earns more, she
would be entitled to have the support increased. 102
B. THE DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORITY TO ENACT AN UNDEREMPLOYMENT
GUIDELINE THAT ALLOWS FOR THE IMPUTATION OF INCOME
The court then turned to Jody's argument that the trial court erred
when it declared the underemployment guideline remedy unreason-
able. 103 The court agreed with Jody that the remedy was a reasonable
action on the part of the Department. of Human Services.1 0 4 The court's
analysis began with examining whether the guideline comported with
precedent. O5 The court emphasized that prior case law had already
established that an obligor's earning capacity was an available factor to
consider when determining an obligor's ability to pay, and therefore the
guideline was merely an "expansion" of precedent.106
The court reasoned that in 1994 they had specifically adopted a
standard by which to impute income, even before the recent guideline
remedy for imputing income was realized. 107 In Olson v. Olson',10 8 the
judicially created standard was that an obligor with an established
earnings history could not, without good reason, place himself in a
position where the obligor was unable to make his child support
payments. 10 9 If an obligor did so, the court concluded that income
could be imputed to him.1 10 Thus, the court adopted a "rule of reason"
with which to analyze an obligor's reduction in income for purposes of
modifying a child support obligation. 1 1
After noting the rationale behind Olson, the court pointed
out that this rule preceded the adoption of the guideline specifically
allowing for the imputation of income based on earning capacity. 1l 2
The court began by articulating the definitions of the new Section
of the administrative code, specifically the sections defining
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07 (1995)).
104. Id. at 744.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Gabel v. Gabel, 434 N.W.2d 722, 724 (N.D. 1989); Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d
74, 76 (N.D. 1985); Burrell v. Burrell, 359 N.W.2d 381, 383 (N.D. 1985); Skogland v. Skogland, 333
N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1983)).
107. Id.
108. 520 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1994).
109. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 744 (citing Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D. 1994)).
110. Id. (citing Olson, 520 N.W.2d at 574). In Olson, the North Dakota Supreme Court found
that the obligor had left a higher-paying teaching job to take a substantially lower-paying job, with little
legitimate reason for doing so. Olson, 520 N.W.2d at 574. The court concluded that even though his
purpose may not have been to evade his support obligations, the guidelines would never have intended
to allow such a drastic reduction in income, and consequently an inability to pay "upon a whim." Id.
III. Id.
112. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 744.
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underemployment, "13 the presumption of underemployment, "l4 and the
guideline definition of community.ll 5  The trial court had concluded
that these definitions were unreasonable and left no room for judicial
discretion. 1 6 Specifically, the trial court interpreted the guideline
definition of "community" as extremely broad and not having a
rational relationship to the actual availability of jobs in those areas.117
Therefore, instead of applying the guidelines, the trial court used the
previous "rule of reason," to find Keith's decision to start his own
business reasonable, and failed to impute income to him.118
The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the statutory
authority of the Department of Human Services that allows it to create
such definitions in their guidelines and whether it was a reasonable
exercise of their rule-making capacity."l 9 The applicable statutory
authority specifically gave the Department of Human Services the ability
to "designate other available resources to be considered" when estab-
lishing child support guidelines.' 20 The court determined that the
amended guideline authorizing the imputation of income did not
confli&t with prior case law allowing -the imputation of income and
therefore did not exceed the Department's scope of authority.121
Consequently, the supreme court ruled that the trial court had errone-
ously concluded that the underemployment guideline was inappropriate
and unreasonable.122
The supreme court went on to disagree with the trial court's
conclusion by stating that the court cannot substitute its view for that of
113. Id. at 745 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(1)(b) (1995)).
114. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-07(2). "An obligor is presumed to be underemployed if the
obligor's gross income from earnings is less than six-tenths of prevailing amounts earned in the
community by persons with similar work history and occupational qualifications." Id.
115. § 75-02-04.1-07(1)(a). "Community includes any place within one hundred miles [160.93
kilometers] of the obligor's actual place of residence." Id.
116. Nelson, 547 N.w.2d at 745; see also Smith, supra note 42, at 79 (discussing how meaningful
judicial discretion and review is being eliminated with the use of increasingly enhanced administrative
guidelines).
117. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 745.
118. id.
119. Id. at 745-46.
120. Id. at 745 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(1) (Supp. 1995)).
121. Id. (citing Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226, 232 (N.D. 1994) (noting
that an administrative agency does not have the power to ignore or overrule judicial precedent); Little
v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1993) (stating that a regulation is beyond an agency's authority
to adopt if it conflicts with the statute it implements)); see also Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873,
878 (N.D. 1992) (guiding arguments for imputing income to an obligor to the Department or the
legislature).
122. Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 748. A trial court's modification is a finding of fact that will not be
reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 743. "[A] finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced
by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence supports it or if, on the entire record, we are left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.
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the Department of Human Services.123 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that if doubts materialize as to the use of these definitions, the argument
for improving them is better directed to the Department of Human
Services or the legislature.124
The supreme court ended its analysis of this issue by negating the
trial court's ruling that the new guideline improperly intruded upon
judicial discretion.125 The court emphasized that trial courts still have
plenty of leeway when determining whether an obligor meets the defini-
tion of underemployed.1 26 Finally, the court disagreed with the trial
court's interpretation that the new guideline was somehow "unjust," and
reiterated the duty that parents have to support their children to the best
of their abilities, not merely to their propensities.127
C. EVIDENCE NEEDED TO PROVE UNDEREMPLOYMENT
After determining that the underemployment guideline was a
reasonable exercise of the Department of Human Services, the court
examined whether the trial court erred in finding that even if the guide-
line applied, that Jody had failed to prove that Keith was under-
employed.128 The court disagreed with Keith's argument that he'could
not be considered unemployed because he is a self-employed obligor
who is continually looking for work. 129 However, because of the defer-
ence a trial court is awarded with respect to weighing the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses, the supreme court deferred to the trial
court's conclusion that the modification should be awarded and income
should not be imputed in this case.130
The supreme court analyzed how the trial court had discounted the
reliability of Jody's use of the North Dakota Labor Market Advisor to
prove the prevailing wage in the community because it provided manu-
facturing wages that were not necessarily the same as the installation
business of the Defendant. 131 Jody had also elicited testimony from
Keith to show that the present prevailing wage in the community was at
123. Id. at 745-46 (citing Scherling v. Scherling, 529 N.W.2d 879, 882 (N.D. 1995)).
124. Id. at 746.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court stressed that the ambiguity of the words "significantly," "prevailing," and
"similar" allows for continued judicial discretion and that even if there is a presumption in the
guideline, it may be rebutted. Id.
127. Id. The court articulated that the Department's objective in adopting the underemployment
guideline was to balance the obligor's freedom to make employment decisions with his duty to support
his children using diligent efforts. Id.
128. Id. at 746-48.
129. Id. at 746.
130. Id. at 746-48.
131. Id. at 747.
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least the wage he earned in 1992.132 However, the trial court had dis-
regarded the reliability of Keith's testimony and therefore found that he
was not underemployed.133
Ultimately, although the supreme court was not willing to hold that
an obligor's own testimony would never be enough to show the prevail-
ing wage in the community, the court did defer to the lower court's
finding of insufficient evidence. 134 The supreme court held that the trial
court's finding that Jody had not presented sufficient evidence to prove
Keith's underemployment, and therefore the trial court's refusal to
impute income to him, was not clearly erroneous.135
In a separate opinion concurring with the result, Chief Justice
VandeWalle voiced concern over the apparent elimination of the
judicially-created "rule of reason." 136 He indicated skepticism regard-
ing an obligor's apparent ability under the guidelines to leave a "plum"
job for a lower-paying job, as long as it is not less than six-tenths the
prevailing wage in the community, with no consequences at all, except at
the expense of the child. 137 Before the new guidelines, the judicially
created "rule of reason" would have made the obligor responsible for
showing that he left a good paying job for legitimate reasons. 138
Though Chief Justice VandeWalle reserved concern for the now obscure
state of "reasonableness" with regard to an obligor's employment
decisions, he stated that as the guidelines are now promulgated, he could
not dissent from the majority opinion.139
IV. IMPACT
The adoption of the new child support guidelines allowing for the
imputation of income to an underemployed obligor has significantly
altered the North Dakota Supreme Court's analysis in determining
whether modification of a support order is warranted in cases where
the obligor has undergone a reduction in income. 140 Because of the
Department of Human Service's recently established criteria for
imputing income, the judicially created "rule of reason" for imputing
income has effectively been limited to cases where the obligation sought
132. Id.
133. Id. Jody argued that if the prevailing wage was $10.50 per hour, which is what Keith was
making in 1992, his present wage of $4.99 per hour was less than six-tenths of that amount, and
therefore he should presumptively be underemployed. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 748.
136. Id. (VandeWalle, C. J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Olson, 520 N.W.2d at 572).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 743-48.
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to be modified is within one year of a previous order. 141 The current
emphasis is that now the obligor need only meet the definition of
underemployed for income to be imputed.1 42 Consequently, Chief
Justice VandeWalle's concern in Nelson as to the state of limbo of
reasonableness has become realized.143
Not only has Nelson reformulated the reasonableness standard, but
it has also redefined the structure of reliable evidence. Nelson developed
the threshold inquiry as to what was reliable evidence needed to prove
the prevailing wage in the community in order to impute income to an
underemployed obligor.144 In sum, Nelson has demonstrated that the
evidence needed to prove underemployment must be a sufficiently
particular and objective indicator of the obligor's work.
Ultimately, the impression that the new guideline for imputing
income based on earning capacity has left is that it is not an easily
established practical remedy.14 5 One aspect that is clear, however, is
child support obligations are subject to increase or decrease regardless of
the voluntariness or involuntariness of the obligor's reduction of income
after one year of a previous decree.146
When the specific provision for imputing income was instituted
in the guidelines, it may have at first seemed easier for the plaintiff
to establish that income should be imputed to the obligor because
the plaintiff no longer had to demonstrate that that the obligor
was "unreasonable" in deciding to change jobs.147 The trigger for
141. Id. at 748 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring); see also Surerus v. Matuska, 548 N.W.2d 384,
387 (N.D. 1996) (stating that reasonableness in a change of jobs, after one year of the initial decree, is
no longer a factor in the court's decision-making process in modification proceedings).
142. See Kjos v. Brandenburg, 552 N.W.2d 63, 66 (N.D. 1996) (considering the nature of the evi-
dence needed to prove underemployment so as to impute income); Surerus, 548 N.W.2d at 387-89
(discussing how to impute income to an incarcerated obligor). The Surerus court applied the guideline
remedy to an incarcerated obligor and imputed income to him. Id. at 387. Though the court stated that
the application of this remedy to an incarcerated obligor may not have been expressly provided for by
the Department, it was nevertheless necessary to apply it. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that
though a finding of underemployment or unemployment was a prerequisite to imputing income, to find
either in this case would serve no purpose since the obligor's imprisonment made the finding a
distinction without a difference. Id. at 388.
143. See Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 748 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring) (expressing reservations
about the freedom of an obligor to voluntarily leave a high paying job that would subsequently lower
his child support obligation).
144. Id. at 747-48. The supreme court has further qualified this standard by emphasizing that the
guidelines use an objective standard to measure the prevailing amounts earned in the community by
persons with similar work history and job qualifications in order to satisfy the definition of
underemployment. Kjos, 552 N.W.2d at 65. In Kjos, the court rejected proof of work aside from the
obligor's regular occupation, due to its subjective nature, and reversed the lower court's finding of
underemployment. Id. at 65-6.
145. See Kos, 552 N.W.2d at 63-66; Nelson, 547 N.W.2d 741 at 748.
146. Surerus, 548 N.W.2d at 387.
147. See Olson 520 N.W.2d at 573 n. I (N.D. 1994) (anticipating the arrival of the new guideline
approach and predicting that problems revolving around the imputation of income would probably not
arise again); Schatke v. Schatke, 520 N.W.2d 833, 837 & n.2 (N.D. 1994) (discussing the analysis for
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imputing income is no longer an intuitive judicial interpretation as to an
obligor's reasonableness in employment decisions, but rather is a more
standardized application of whether the obligor meets the definition of
underemployed. However, as in the Nelson case, proving that the obligor
is actually underemployed seems to be an obstacle in itself.148 The
proof problems that were underscored by the Task Force have ultimately
proven to be a more difficult constraint in practice.149 Though the
supreme court has approved of the new method for imputing income
due to its promotion of North Dakota's strong public policy of protect-
ing children's best interests, it remains to be seen how practical a remedy
it will prove to be.150
Gretchen Dee Thilmony
determining reasonableness in text and again referring to the arrival of the new guidelines as a
potential problem-solver in a footnote).
148. See Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 743-48; see also Kjos, 552 N.W.2d at 66 (concluding that the
evidence was not strong enough for a finding of underemployment).
149., Nordwall, supra note 75, at 18.
150. For additional information regarding the practical limitations of this aspect of the North
Dakota Child Support Guidelines, see Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child Support and the "Voluntary
Reduction of Income" Doctrine, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 647,725 (1997).
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